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The two areas of the social sciences which were more stimulated by Darwin's research were anthropology and
sociology. The Frenchman, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), generally regarded as the father of sociology and the
originator of that term, laid the groundwork for the immediate application of the law of evolution to the study
of society. Comte's conception of sociology is derived from his philosophy of history. Sharing the
Enlightenment belief in progress, Comte saw history evolving through three stages. The first was the
theological stage, in which men supplied supernatural explanations for the natural and social phenomena. This
was followed bu what Comte called the metaphysical stage, a period when men were immersed in speculation.
The nineteenth century, he contended, was witnessing the dawn of the third, or positivist, stage of human
history. Man was searching for, and would find, scientific law to explain social phenomena. Comte was
convinced that through the discovery of these laws man would be able to control his destiny. After the
publication of the Origin of Species, many thinkers were persuaded that the principal law had been discovered.
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3. Darwinism and the Rise of Social Science 
The two areas of the social sciences which were most stimu­
lated by Darwin's research were anthropology and sociology. The 
Frenchman, S^KBale-Conite (1798-1857), generally regarded as the 
fattipr nf +V>rv O-i nat.nr nf that term. 1 aid the 
groundwork for th*:^  immAriiatp annii cation of the law of evoluti.Q 
to the study of society^. Comte's conception of sociology is 
derived from his philosophy of history. Sharing the Enlighten­
ment belief in progr^s, Comte saw history evolving throuaJi-
thiifi£_Ktag.es. The t^irs^ was the theologl^'ai stayp, in which men 
piippi ai:iations for nattiral and social phe­
nomena. This was followed.j33L_what Comte called the metaphysical 
stage, a p^iod when merTlyere immersed in speculation^ -Tlie.^ 
"nineteenth century. he contended, was witnessing the jjajm-oJ-Jthe 
:^tliird^ or pos,ltIjvi St, stage of hum^_ii.i stnrsTI Man was searching 
fQI^ , am^ oiifd find, scientific la^  to explain social phenomen'^ , 
Comte was convinced that'through the discovery of these laws man 
would be able to control his destinyo After the publication of 
the Origin of Species^ many thinkers were persuaded that the ^ 
principal law had been discovered. 
' Among those inspired by Darwin's biological law of evolu­
tion was Edward Burnett Tvlor (1832-1917), the father of social 
or cultural anthropology. Anthropology is "the science that 
•studies man as both a physical and a social being, finding its 
materaraTs" and problems primarily in the races, languages, and 
cultures to be found in various places and at various times in 
man's history. Physical anthropology deals .with thft.. bodily form 
oJE-ittan, special attehfTon being given to racial differences. 
Social anthropology studies linguistic and cultural differences 
o 
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between and among groups of hiaman beings, 
Tylor was born of Quaker parents in England during a time 
when the university regulations of that country denied admis­
sion to Quakers, His formal education, consequently, was lim­
ited, Poor health during adolescence caused him to abandon 
work in his father's brass foundry and to travel abroad. He 
made a tour of Mexico and his first book was an account of the 
investigations made during this trip, Ty]r>r'''ct ma-jny work was 
Primitive Culture; Researches into the Development of Mythol­
ogy, PhiTosophy7~Religxon, Language, Art~and Custom 1T871)" 
wETch auickly"Tecaiie the standard "treaTis"e~on anthropology, 
From 1883 to the closing years oT'hiiTTri, TyTor^as at Oxford. 
He served originally as keeper of the museum and later as the 
university's first professor of anthropology, 
Tylor's importance as an anthropologist is to be found 
less in his concTusi^ns than in his general_.japprQach 
^'slBjia^T'oT^societies", flppTi iit i onivrv theories to the 
races of mankind, falling into the then-common error which held 
that the NegriiijtL-aBd MongolQiji..jaces repxfiaeiate.CIsSra&ea,.iji..^ t^^  
development of theJh:aMLa>a^JF.ase, Tylor has also been criticized 
--•'^oFex^arfiTng tlTat the customs of primitive peoples were the 
result of their moral and intellectual inferiority, and for 
not understanding them as the product of historical conditions 
and environmental forces. But his contribution to the devel­
opment of the social sciences cannot be judged from such con­
clusions, His true significance lies in the fact that he was 
actually open-minded regarding methods for explaining human 
life in all its complexity. As the following selection from 
Primitive Culture indicates, his ma in mnroT-n was that man 
m^ .jL,studj^ Jiis__culJ|y:.e>,_as,,A,-.&^ PLlgS,.^ ^^  ^
himself. """"" 
Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide eth­
nographic sense, is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge„ belief, art, moralss law, custom, and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a mem­
ber of society. The condition of cralture among the 
various societies of mankind, in so far as it is capable 
of being investigated on general principles^ is a subje<^ 
apt for the study of laws of human thought and action. 
On the one hand, the uniformity which so largely per-
vades civilization mav be asf-.ribfid. in great measure, 
the uniform action of uniform causes: while on the other 
hand its various grades may be regarded as stages of 
development_-ax ryftlnn each the outcome of previous 
history, and about to do its proper part in shaping the 
history of the future. To the investigation of these 
two great principles in several departments of ethnog­
raphy, with especial consideration of the civilization 
of the lower tribes as related to the civilization of 
the higher nations the present volumes are devoted. 
Our modern investigators in the sciences of inorganic 
nature are foremost to recognize, both within and without 
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their special fields of work, the unity of oatiirff. the 
fixity of _JJ^-laws, the definlJ^e-JSjOimgJlga-jgf ranse .And 
ef fect~~through whi-ChL-.-fixexy- fae-t--depends Qa.»iyfea-t,has. gone 
be7o?e~3rrr"and"acts upon what is to come MAex-it. They 
grasp firmlynthV'Pythagorean doctrine of pervading order 
in the universal Kosmos. They affirm, with Aristotle, 
that nature is not full of incoherent episodes, like a 
bad tragedy. They agree with Leibnitz in what he calls 
"my axiom, that nature never acts by leaps (la nature 
n'agit jamais par saut)as well as in his "great prin­
ciple, commonly little employed, that nothing happens 
without its sufficient reason." Nor, again, in studying 
the structure and habits of plants and animals, or in 
investigating the lower functions even of man, are these 
leading ideas unacknowledged. But when we come to talk 
of the higher processes of human feeling and action, of 
thought and language, knowledge and art, a change appears 
in the prevalent tone of opinion. The world at large is 
scarcely prepared to accept the general stufly 01 human 
life as a branch of natiiral science, and to carry out, in 
a large sense, the poet's injunction to "Account for moral 
as for natural things." To many educated minds tjere 
seems something presumptuoui^ .a.nfiCri'gSfri^ 'ive"^  
that mankind i 
historirof nature, that our thoughts, anf^ actio 
laws "as definite as. those which govern the 
motion of wavfis. the comb"inati6ft 0_t ar.iris and bases " 
t V ^ ^  | ; y r n w ± J 3 - - - < » # - H 9 - 3 r f t » 4 g I  a " a j ^  
T 
The main reasons of this state of t£e popular judg­
ment are not far to seek. There are many who would will­
ingly accept a science of history if placed before them 
with substantial definiteness of principle and evidence, 
but who not unreasonably reject the systems offered to 
them, as falling too far short of a scientific standard. 
Through resistance such as this, real knowledge always 
sooner or later makes its way, while the habit of opposition 
to novelty does such excellent service against the invasions 
of speculative dogmatism, that we may sometimes even wish 
it were stronger than it is. But other obstacles to the 
investigation of laws of human nature arise from consid­
erations of metaphysics and theology. The popular notion 
of free human will involves not only freedom to act in 
accordance with motive, but also a power of breaking loose 
from continuity and acting without cause, -- a combination 
which may be roughly illustrated by the simile of a bal­
ance sometimes acting in the usual way, but also possessed 
of the faculty of turning by itself without or against its 
weights. This view of an anomalous action of the will, 
which it need hardly be said is incompatible with scien­
tific argument, subsists as an opinion patent or latent in 
men's minds, and strongly affecting their theoretic views 
of history, though it is not, as a rule, brought promin­
ently forward in systematic reasoning. Indeed the defini­
tion of human will, as strictly according with motive, is 
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the only possible scientific basis in such enquiries. 
Happily, it is not needful to add here yet another to the ^ 
list of dissertations on supernatural intervention and ^ 
natural causation, on liberty, predestination, and accoun-y' 
tability. We may hasten to escape from the re 
transcendental philosophy and theolgov^to starton a more 
hopeful journey over more practicable ground. None will 
deny thaf, as FacK^ m by the evidence of his own 
consciousness, d^inite and natural cause does, to a 
great_g^l£iLl^ determJjifi-imman action, Then, keeping 
aside from considerations of extra-natural interference 
and causeless spontaneity, let us take this admitted 
existence of natural cause and effect as our standing-
ground, and travel on it so far as it will bear us. It 
is on this same basis that physical science pursues, 
with ever-increasing success, its quest of laws of nature. 
Nor need this restriction hamper the scientific study of 
human life, in which the real difficulties are the prac­
tical ones of enormous complexity of evidence, and imper­
fection of methods of observation....„».« 
Among evidence aiding us to trace the course which 
the civilization of the world Has actualTv"^ol 
that great class of facts to denote which I have found J.t 
rnnveni (Rnt to i ntrndiir.e These are 
customs. _o 
een carried on by force oi habit into 
s, and so which have 
a new sfaTe of 
society different-_-£rQm„lJia±-„iii which they had their 
original home, -aad they thus remain ^ 
amples of an older condition of culture nut of whirh a 
ha«ljieen-.-jeyQlved^  Thus, I Enow an old Somersetshire 
woman whose hand-loom dates from the time before the in­
troduction of the "flying shuttle," which new-fangled 
appliance she has never even learnt to use, and I have 
seen her throw her shuttle from hand to hand in true 
classic fashion; this old woman is not a century behind 
her times, but she is a case of survival. Such examples 
often lead as back to the habits of hundreds and even 
thousands of years ago. The ordeal of the Key and Bible, 
still in use, is a survival; the Midsummer bonfire is a 
survival; the Breton peasants' All Souls' supper for the 
spirits of the dead is a survival. The simple keeping up 
of ancient habits is only one part of the transition from 
old into new and changing times. The serious business of 
ancient society may be seen to sink into the sport of 
later genera.tions, and its serious belief to linger on in 
nursery folk-lore, while superseded habits of old-world 
life may be modified into new-world forms still powerful 
for good and evil. Sometimes old t)-|nnfTht.ct, and prar.tir.As 
vgll burst out afresjx7''"''To"~tHe~lima of a world that 
thought them^ioiog'^sTnce dead" or ^ dying; "¥ere '^''suSLlS^ a^  
p^sse^ Into revivalt 'as has lately '^ in so "remark-
abXe"^way in the history of modern spiritualism, a sub­
ject full of instruction from the ethnographer's point of 
view. The study of the principles of survival has, indeed, /l i n pi n a a.
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no small practical importance, for most of what we call 
superstition is included within survival, and in this way 
rieg~TipennEo'™fB^^ of its deadlTe^ enemy, a reason­
able explanation. Insignificant, moreover, as multitudes 
of the facts of survival are in themselves, their study is 
so effeGtiv-e—iac. tracing the course of the historicar de-"~ 
yel'opment through which'^ ,„I?OS&lb 1 e to~"un^rstand 
their ^  becomes-a- vital- point of ethno-
graphic research to gain the clearest-.pQssiEig„insi£^^ 
into their natuge.. This importance must justify the de-
tail~Tiere devoted to an examination of survival, on the 
evidence of such games, popular sayings, customs, super­
stitions, and the like, as may serve well to bring into 
view the manner of its operation. 
Progress^ degradation, survival. revival, modijti^ 
cation5 are all modes of the connexion "that binds together 
tlie"coffipl^ of civilization.. It" needs but "a glance 
into the trivial details of our own daily life to set us 
thinking how far we are really its originators, and how 
far but the transmitters and modifiers of the results of 
long past ages. Looking round the rooms we live in, we 
may try here how far he who only knows his own time can 
be capable of rightly comprehending even that. Here is 
the honeysuckle of Assyria, there the fleur-de-lis of 
Anjou, a cornice with a Greek border runs round the ceil­
ing, the style of Louis XIV, and its parent the Renais­
sance share the looking-glass between them. Transformed, 
shifted J or mutilated, such elements of art still carry 
their history plainly stamped upon them, and if 
"tory, .yet farther bjgMud..is less easy to read, we are not 
to §a^ that because we cannot clearly discern it there""is 
therefore iTd., history ,,tEe^ wFth the 
fashion of the clothes men wear. The ridiculous little 
tails of the German postilion's coat show of themselves 
how they came to dwindle to such absurd rudiments; but 
the English clergyman's bands no longer so convey their 
history to the eye, and look unaccountable enough till 
one has seen the intermediate stages through which they 
came down from the more serviceable wide collars, such as 
Milton wears in his portrait, and which gave their name 
to the "band-box" they used to be kept in. In fact, the 
books of costume, showing how one garment grew or shrank 
by gradual stages and passed into another, illustrate 
with much force and clearness the nature of the change 
and growth, revival and decay, which go on from year to 
year in more important matters of life. In books, again, 
we see each writer not for and by himself, but occupying 
his proper place in history; we look through each philos­
opher, mathematician, chemist, poet, into the background 
of his education, — through Leibnitz into Descartes, 
through Dalton into Priestley, through Milton into Homer. 
The study gf 1 anguaae-Jias. perhaps, doae moxe than any 
otheK Inuxeciavixig from our view.-,of human thought and ac-
tion the ideas of^ chance and arbitary invention, and in 
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substituting for them a theory of dev^l npmp»rit by tho en 
o^er at ion o;f2ygc[^4dijjij..j^a7t% ever reas-
onaBT|"^ M~XntejULi&^  ^ the. facts are^ TuTTy'^ known, 
Rudimentary as the science of culturer s-EilT'is, the symp­
toms are becoming very strong that even what seem its most 
spontaneous and motiveless phenomena will, nevertheless, 
be shown to come within the range of distinct cause and 
effect as certainly as the facts of mechanics. 
bepopularlv thought more ir^efinite and uncontr 
t3ge~produGl^  of thia inTaTpTrnyTXQn in mvths~aiTd~"fiib3res? Yet 
any systematic investigation of mythology. on the basis 
oi a wide collection oi evTdence, wiTT"show plainly enough 
in such efforts of fancy at once a 3eveTo^enT~from stage 
to stage, and a production of uniformity nf rp.sixlJi,, from 
uniformity of-j&aiis.^^ HereT" as" elsewhere. causeless spon-
tah^irty""is seen to recede farther and farther into shelter 
within the dark precincts of ignorance; like chance, that 
still holds its place among the vulgar as a real cause of 
events otherwise unaccountable, while to educated men it 
has long consciously meant nothing but this ignorance it­
self. It is only when men fail to see the line of con­
nexion in events5, that they are prone to fall upon the 
notions of arbitrary impulses, causeless freaks, chance 
and nonsense and indefinite unaccountability. If child­
ish games, purposeless customs, absurd superstitions are 
set down as spontaneous because no one can say exactly 
how they came to be, the assertion may remind us of the 
like effect that the eccentric habits of the wild rice-
plant had on the philosophy of a Red Indian tribe, other­
wise disposed to see in the harmony of nature the effects 
of one controlling personal will. The Great Spirit, said 
these Sioux theologians, made all things except the wild 
rice; but the wild rice came by chance. 
"Man," said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "ever connects on 
from what lies at hand..,." The notion of the continuity 
of civilization contained in this maxim is no barren 
philosophic principle, but is at once made practical by 
the consideration that thevL^who wish to understand their 
own lives ought to know the stages through which their 
Ctffitescarceiy oveFslaTed~"the~l^^ of tnis study of 
development, when he declared at the beginning of his 
'Positive Philosophy" that "no conception can be under­
stood except through its history," and his phrase will 
bear extension to culture at large. To expect to look 
modern life in the face and comprehend it by mere inspec­
tion, is a philosophy whose weakness can easily be tested. 
Imagine any one explaining the trivial saying, "a little 
bird told me," without knowing of the old belief in the 
language of birds and beasts, to which Dr. Dasent, in the 
introduction to the Norse Tales, so reasonably traces its 
origin. To ingenious attempts at explaining by the light 
of reason things which want the light of history to show 
their meaning, much of the learned nonsense of the world 
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has indeed been due.... Such are the risks that philos­
ophers run in detaching any phenomenon of civilization 
from its hold on past events, and treating it as an 
isolated fact, to be simply disposed of by a guess at some plausible explanation. * 
